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Hong Kong Identity and Democratic Values 
March 20, 2012 in Uncategorized by The China Beat 
By Sebastian Veg 
When Peking University Professor Kong Qingdong’s diatribe on Hongkongers and their 
lingering colonial infatuation swept over the Internet in late January, the widespread and growing 
uneasiness about mainland Chinese in Hong Kong suddenly had a face. Triggered by a viral 
video of a Hongkonger telling off a mainland family in the subway because their daughter was 
eating dry instant noodles, Kong’s interview sparked a wave of predictable but nonetheless 
justified outrage in Hong Kong. It took place against the background of the annual mainland 
shopping spree over Chinese New Year (in a previous episode, Dolce and Gabbana staff in Tsim 
Sha Tsui sparked protests by telling passers-by that only mainlanders were allowed to take 
pictures of the shop) as well as growingly acrimonious debates over mainland women giving 
birth in the emergency rooms of Hong Kong hospitals in order to secure permanent residency for 
their children, and over Guangdong-registered vehicles’ right to drive freely in Hong Kong. It 
was followed by a counter-campaign in Apple Daily and other Hong Kong newspapers depicting 
mainlanders as locusts looting Hong Kong, pushing up property prices and free-riding on the—
albeit minimal—welfare provided by the SAR government. 
Professor Kong, in a true cadre-style tirade with a thin varnish of May Fourth anti-colonialism, 
referred to Lu Xun’s 1927 critique of colonial Hong Kong and his denunciation of xizai 西崽, 
the fake-foreign devils populating Shanghai’s concessions, chastised by Lu Xun for being “dogs 
to the foreigners but wolves to their fellow Chinese.” He conceded that Hong Kong had some 
advantages, “for example the legal system” or fazhi 法制, but, he hastened to add, this was only 
necessary because Hongkongers’ suzhi 素質, or “human quality” was so low. In China, he went 
on, there is no need for the rule of law because social harmony is achieved by raising the 
people’s moral qualities, an echo of teachings of his 73th generation forefather, Confucius. Suzhi 
is one of the terms popularized by the CCP that has come to feel natural on the mainland (the 
more traditional term would be pinzhi 品質, or “moral fibre”) and served to legitimize the quasi-
apartheid system instituted by Mao and based on the distinction between urban and rural 
residence permits (hukou). In this logic, urban residents are commonly associated with high 
suzhi, as opposed to peasants and—according to Kong—Hongkongers. Interestingly, and 
regrettably, many Hong Kongers have phrased their resistance to the mainlanders’ “invasion” in 
very similar terms. The anti-“locust” and anti-pregnant mother campaign, vocally relayed by the 
local democrats, has not focused on the values that make Hong Kong unique and different from 
China, but on the insufficiently “civilized” habits of mainlanders. 
While a December poll suggested that the feeling of Chinese identity among Hong Kong citizens 
was at an all-time low (immediately provoking a furious denial on the private blog of a Central 
liaison office employee who protested that the questions had been asked in an “unscientific” 
way: as Hong Kong is not a country, it has no identity attached to it), there has been little 
reflection about what makes the current waves of immigration from China different from the 
many previous ones that were, over time, fused into the distinctive culture that has made Hong 
Kong unique. Not all the people leaving Guangdong or Shanghai throughout the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s were, after all, political refugees; many were simply relatives from across the border 
hoping for a better life. Yet it seems that Hong Kong is now more apprehensive about losing its 
difference. The question is what exactly that difference is. Formulating it in the discourse of 
suzhi means that mainlanders are derided for failing to form orderly queues, for speaking loudly 
in public places, and for flouting established social rules, like eating or drinking in the MTR. 
Rarely in this debate have Hong Kong’s distinctive values been characterized by critics of 
mainland presence as “democratic,” based on freedom of expression, mutual respect and equality 
not only before the law but also in social interactions. The ever observant Chinese political 
commentator Chang Ping, whose work-visa application to Hong Kong has been placed 
indefinitely on hold by the SAR government, noted in the South China Morning Post op-ed 
“Brothers in arms” that what Hongkongers might legitimately resent is not the presence of 
mainlanders in Hong Kong as much as what we might call the “cadre culture” that characterizes 
many of the compulsive Chinese shoppers on the New Year spree: a type of behavior by a very 
specific type of person underlining that they are powerful and somehow above the law—a type 
of behavior resented by many ordinary citizens on the mainland. But Hong Kong’s democrats in 
particular have failed to provide any kind of political reading of the population’s uneasiness: 
instead they have indulged in populist escalation, calling to revise the Basic Law to deprive 
Hong Kong-born children of mainland mothers of the right to permanent residency. The 
democrats are often criticized for having no political program beyond democracy, but perhaps it 
would be more exact to say that their understanding of democracy oftentimes seems limited to an 
orderly queue of people lining up—in front of a ballot box they may never reach. 
More generally, fifteen years after the handover, the relationship between China and Hong Kong 
is as complex as ever. The Dengist calculation, according to which the “decolonization of 
minds,” as enforced through “patriotic education,” would produce “patriotic” citizens (i.e. 
Beijing loyalists) in Hong Kong and therefore lay the foundation for “safe” universal suffrage, 
has not translated into reality. On the contrary, it has produced a group of young, vocal anti-
Beijing activists, who seem to speak for the entire post-80s generation, aggravated by rising 
housing prices and growing social inequality which the handover has entailed. In the larger 
picture, however, this group remains a minority, squeezed between a super-elite of tycoons and 
businessmen with interests in China, and a large working class, steadily growing by the effect of 
immigration from the mainland, which has no particular feeling of cultural identity in Hong 
Kong. As it already did in colonial times, this working class sees itself to a strong extent as part 
of a larger Cantonese culture, totally disconnected from the lifestyle of the English-speaking 
elite. The democrats try to cater to this part of the population by framing the issue of mainlanders 
in Hong Kong in populist terms (“they will take your hospital spots”), while seeming to ignore 
that this part of the population massively votes for the pro-Beijing DAB (Democratic Alliance 
for the Betterment of Hong Kong). Contrary to what has happened in Taiwan, however, the sense 
of a Hong Kong identity that is both local and democratic has little or no grassroots base in the 
larger population. Those commentators who have recently engaged in colonial nostalgia might 
do well to remember that this division of society is exactly the product of the colonial regime. 
This is the context in which the two elections of 2012, the chief executive on March 25 and the 
LegCo elections in September, will take place. Interestingly, the profiles of the three candidates 
competing for Chief Executive seem to tally almost exactly with the three social groups outlined 
above. Henry Tang represents the pro-Beijing elite of tycoons and businessmen; Albert Ho, the 
pan-democrat with no chance of winning, the squeezed middle class; and Leung Chun-ying the 
pro-Beijing populist who scares the tycoons, the loosely pro-Chinese working class. In this 
context, in which a political definition of democracy seem to have largely disappeared from the 
values deemed to define Hong Kong, and even from the entire campaign debate, one may 
wonder, with a pinch of nostalgia, whether “Hong Kong identity” has not simply become a 
stand-in for what in another context has been called the déjà disparu—Hong Kong’s democratic 
culture. 
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